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This article aims to explain the patterns of 
corruption in the environmental sector 
(environmental corruption) and the possibility for 
Independent agencies to address them. Also, to 
initiate a better policy and supervision against 
environmental corruption in Indonesia. The 
research was carried out based on the normative 
legal method (library research) towards secondary 
data using a statutory, conceptual, and comparative 
approach. The results show that the main pattern of 
environmental corruption involves corrupt actors in 
bureaucratic institutions that cause weak 
environmental policies and supervision. The benefit 
of Independent Agencies with structural and 
personnel independence is expected to fill the gap in 
the old bureaucratic management and reduce 
corruption. The regulatory power of such agencies 
can also set more stringent environmental policy 
and supervision. Thus, there needs to be institutional 
reform in the environmental authorities for future 
policies by establishing an independent agency. The 
new agency must also have the power to formulate 
and enact policies in environmental management 
and give them authority to investigate and impose 
sanctions. We also recommend compiling a national 
strategic program in the form of work synergy 
between independent agencies in the environmental 
and anti-corruption sector. 
 
A. Introduction  
In the Indonesian context, the high number of corruption cases is an old 
issue that cannot be fully resolved. Although a series of efforts have been 
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made to reduce the number of corruption, they have not completely eradicated 
the corruption that has long been rooted in the bureaucracy and society.1 
Throughout 2018, the Corruption Eradication Commission carried out at least 
30 arrests targeting ministries, DPR members, and regional heads. In the same 
year, state losses due to corruption reached Rp. 9.29 trillion. The KPK also 
receives around 7,000 letters per year from the public reporting allegations of 
corruption.2 During the first semester of 2020, Indonesia’s Corruption Watch 
(ICW) recorded total state losses from corruption cases amounting to IDR 39.2 
trillion. During the last year, the number of corruption cases also resulted in 
the fall of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in Indonesia from the score 
of 40 in 2019 to 37 in 2020, as released by Transparency International.3 
In terms of corruption in the environmental sector, since 2009, Human 
Rights Watch has reported the impact of corruption crimes in the forestry 
sector, which cause an average of USD 2 billion in material losses per year.4 
The KPK studies on the forestry sector and commercial wood production up 
to 2014 also showed that the state continued to suffer losses every year due to 
logging activity and timber production, almost eighty percent of which were 
not recorded by the Ministry of Environment.5 Whereas, according to law, 
those are counted as the theft of state assets classified as corruption. In 2018, 
the KPK also recorded potential losses in the mineral and coal sector from 
underpaying taxes Rp. 15.9 trillion, this amount does not include losses from 
maladministration and flawed licensing system which reached Rp. 28.5 
trillion. 
In addition to material losses, corruption also correlates with a decline in 
environmental quality. Several studies have shown that large amounts of 
corruption impact weak environmental regulations, leading to increased 
environmental exploitation and decreased environmental quality.6 Based on 
the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2020, by using 32 performance 
                                                             
1 Muh Rinaldy Bima and Rizki Ramadani, “Position of Supervisory Board Organ and Its 
Implications for the Institutional Corruption Eradication Commission,” Law Reform 16, no. 2 
(2020): 179–97, https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v16i2.33770. 
2 Dylan Aprialdo Rachman, “Kerugian Negara Akibat Korupsi Capai Rp. 929 Triliun,” 
Kompas.com, 2019. 
3 Wardhany Tsa Tsia, “Crowded Criticism Corruption Perception Index Score in Indonesia Is 
Dropping,” Voice Of Indonesia, 2021, https://voi.id/en/berita/29720/crowded-criticism-
corruption-perception-index-score-in-indonesia-is-dropping. 
4 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia; “Wild Money”; The Human Rights Consequences of Illegal 
Logging and Corruption in Indonesia’s Forestry Sector (New York: HRW, 2009). 
5 Direktorat Penelitian dan Pengembangan (Kedeputian Bidang Pencegahan), “Mencegah 
Kerugian Negara Di Sektor Kehutanan Sebuah Kajian Tentang Sistem Penerimaan Negara 
Bukan Pajak Dan Penatausahaan Kayu,” Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2015, 
https://acch.kpk.go.id/images/tema/litbang/pengkajian/pdf/Laporan-PNBP-Kehutanan-KPK-
report-web.pdf. 
6 Heyin Chen et al., “The Impact of Environmental Regulation, Shadow Economy, and 
Corruption on Environmental Quality: Theory and Empirical Evidence from China,” Journal 
of Cleaner Production 195 (2018): 200–214, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.05.206. 
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indicators across 11 issue categories, the EPI placed Indonesia as the 116th 
rank from 180 countries on environmental health and ecosystem vitality.7 
Further below Singapore, whose score is at 39th place, Malaysia is in 68th 
position. If the results of this environmental index are juxtaposed with 
Indonesia's corruption perception index, the assumption that "corruption 
causes environmental quality to deteriorate" becomes very logical.  
As stated by Winbourne, environmental corruption may occur across many 
transactions, starting from bribery and cronyism on the level of developing 
national policy, embezzlement in implementing environmental programs, 
bribery in issuing permits and licenses, including collecting "rents" while 
enforcing environmental policies.8 This statement is coherent with the results 
of the public sector integrity survey conducted by the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), where the licensing process is the most vulnerable aspect 
to the practice of corruption.9 Corruption cases were also dominated by local 
government officials at the provincial and district/city levels. Among the 
several existing modes of corruption, bribery is the most frequent occurrence 
in environmental corruption.10 
This study examines environmental corruption from the constitutional law 
perspective and the theory of independent state institutions as an analysis 
point. For this reason, this article addresses three main questions as follows: 
first, what is the pattern that is reflected in environmental corruption? Second, 
can independent agencies play a role in closing the loopholes for 
environmental corruption? Third, what are the optimal policies and 




1. The Patterns of Environmental Corruption 
The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public power for 
private gain”,11 and acknowledges that corruption is one of the greatest 
obstacles to economic and social development. Several other experts have also 
                                                             
7 Environmental Performance Index, “Global Metrics for the Environment: Ranking Country 
Performance on Sustainability Issues,” Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, 2020, 
https://epi.yale.edu/downloads/epipolicymakersummaryr11.pdf. 
8 Svetlana Winbourne, “Corruption and the Environment” (Washington, D.C., 2020). 
9 Fauziah Rasad, “Korupsi Dan Hak Asasi Manusia Dalam Sektor Kehutanan,” Jurnal HAM 9, 
no. 2 (2018): 121–38, https://doi.org/10.30641/ham.2018.9.121-138. 
10 Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, “Laporan Tahunan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Tahun 
2014” (Jakarta, 2014). 
11 Sofik Handoyo and Fury Khristianty Fitriyah, “Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, 
Political Stability, and Environmental Sustainability: A Cross-National Analysis,” Journal of 
Accounting Auditing and Business 1, no. 2 (2018): 28–38, 
https://doi.org/10.24198/jaab.v1i2.18344. 




defined corruption. Rose Ackerman12 For example, classify corruption into 
three kinds of dimensions, economic, cultural, and political dimensions. 
Corruption in the economic dimension is described as a symptom of state 
maladministration. The institutions that are supposed to regulate relations 
between the state and its citizens are used for their benefit. In the cultural 
dimension, corruption is interpreted as a tradition of giving bribes, and gifts 
which others refer to as corrupt. Meanwhile, in the political dimension, 
corruption is described as corrupt behavior by government actors who 'have 
an affair' with private parties. 
However, as Petter Langseth wrote, there is no single definition of 
corruption representing its full, comprehensive, and universal 
understanding.13 Such efforts will limit the definition of corruption, which can 
be very broad or specific, depending on the systems and traditions that apply 
in each society and country. This is also the basis for that in consideration of 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption. It was agreed not to limit 
the meaning of corruption to one general definition but to only mention the 
types of acts categorized as corruption.14 The offenses mandated by the UN 
Convention include the active and passive bribery of national public officials; 
active bribery of a foreign or international public official; money laundering; 
and embezzlement, misappropriation, or other diversions of property by a 
public official, including active and passive bribery in the private sector and 
trading in influence.15 
 In Indonesia, the Corruption Eradication Law classifies corruption into 
seven groups, namely: (1) detrimental to state finances (enriching oneself or 
abusing authority to harm state finances); (2) bribery; (3) gratuities; (4) 
embezzlement in office; (5) extortion; (6) fraudulent acts; and (7) conflicts of 
interest. Such acts of corruption can occur in various sectors, including the 
environmental sector or termed 'environmental corruption'. Although there is 
no specific definition of this term, based on the annual review prepared by 
Tacconi and Williams, it is known that the type of corruption is in the 
Environmental and Resources Management (ERM) sector. ERM corruption is 
then divided into certain sectors such as corruption in the extractive industries 
(minerals, oil, and gas), irrigation, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and 
conservation activities.16 
                                                             
12 Susan Rose Ackerman, Korupsi Dan Pemerintahan Sebab Akibat Dan Reformasi (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2006). 
13 Arthur Shacklock, Fredrik Galtung, and Charles Sampford, Measuring Corruption, 1st ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2016). 
14 Luca Tacconi and David Aled Williams, “Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Environmental 
and Resource Management,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 45 (2020): 305–
29, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012320-083949. 
15 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Corruption: A Glossary 
of International Criminal Standards (Paris: OECD, 2007). 
16 Tacconi and Williams, “Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Environmental and Resource 
Management.” 
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 There is a close relationship between the variables of corruption and 
environmental policies with the increasingly severe environmental damage, 
from a study conducted by Damania et al.17, It can be seen that there is a clear 
correlation between the level of government corruption and the flexibility of 
policies in the environmental sector. In principle, it is said that: the lower the 
corruption at the government level, the tighter the environmental policies will 
be. In other research, who analyzed the relationship between corruption and 
political instability also concluded the same thing, that corruption could 
reduce the strictness of regulations in the environmental sector. Thus, it can 
be said that corruption has contributed greatly to weak policies and 
supervision in the environmental sector. 
Weak policies that are mainly open to investment and business interests 
will further facilitate environmental damage.  In this case, the environmental 
aspect is more often the second priority after investment and economic 
interests.18 This statement is not a mere assumption. Several previous studies 
have shown a positive correlation between weak and business-oriented 
environmental policies and the high level of environmental damage. The 
research conducted by Chen et al.19 For example, shows a relationship 
between the hidden informal economy sector (shadow economy) and bad 
environmental policies on high environmental pollution in China. The more 
corrupt government officials, the weaker environmental policies will be, 
resulting in higher pollution and environmental pollution. In another study 
conducted by Sinha et al.20 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(BRICS), and 11 other countries between 1990-2017, shows that much corrupt 
behavior has increased environmental damage by reducing the use of 
renewable energy. However, it is also found that corruption increases fossil 
energy consumption, which harms the environment.  
It is also found that there is a tendency that environmental corruption is 
more prone to occur in countries whose development is developing with 
bureaucratic institutional systems.21 Bureaucracy here is defined as a state 
institutional system and its administration with a complex, significant, and 
hierarchical arrangement or levels. It is well known that this kind of 
                                                             
17 Richard Damania, Per G. Fredriksson, and John A. List., “Trade Liberalization, Corruption, 
and Environmental Policy Formation: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 46, no. 3 (2003): 490–512, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-
0696(03)00025-1. 
18 Herry Purnomo et al., “Politik Ekonomi Kebakaran Hutan Dan Asap Di Indonesia,” Center 
for International Forestry Research, 2015, https://forestsnews.cifor.org/30905/politik-ekonomi-
kebakaran-hutan-dan-asap-di-indonesia?fnl=en. 
19 Heyin Chen et al., “The Impact of Environmental Regulation, Shadow Economy, and 
Corruption on Environmental Quality: Theory and Empirical Evidence from China.” 
20 Avik Sinha et al., “Impact of Corruption in the Public Sector on Environmental Quality: 
Implications for Sustainability in BRICS and next 11 Countries,” Journal of Cleaner 
Production 232 (2019): 1379–93, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.066. 
21 Sinha et al. 




government bureaucratic model is a vulnerable loophole for corruption which 
can occur at every level of government, like the central and regional levels.22 
This is due to the old bureaucratic pattern, which still relies on actors with 
great authority, so they are vulnerable to abuse. Also, as mentioned by Nagara 
et al.,23 it is not uncommon for officials in the bureaucracy to face conflicts of 
interest or structural problems such as power intervention from higher 
government elites and other interest groups in the corruption network such as 
political parties and business circles.  
 
Figure 1. The Patterns of Environmental Corruption 
Source: Author’s Processed result, 2020. 
 
Based on figure 1, corruption in the environmental sector can be described 
as follows: first, there is corrupt behavior by the government or bureaucratic 
officials in the environmental sector who use their authority for personal gain. 
Second, this corrupt behavior causes policies and supervision in the 
environmental sector to become loose, business-oriented, and weak 
environmental law enforcement in general. Third, inadequate policies and 
supervision have resulted in increased environmental damage and pollution. 
Thus, state losses come from acts of corruption and environmental damage 
due to weak supervision by the government.  
In the case of Indonesia, the environmental corruption pattern also 
mentioned by Muslihudin et al. as:24  1) Provision of licensing from the 
regional head to the businessmen in the form of rewarded bribes from the 
entrepreneurs to smooth the business licensing. 2) Corruption in the 
Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) process, in the form of bribery to get 
                                                             
22 Kisno Hadi, “Korupsi Birokrasi Pelayanan Publik Di Era Otonomi Daerah,” Jurnal 
Penelitian Politik 7, no. 1 (2016): 51–70, https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v7i1.512. 
23 Grahat Nagara et al., “Persoalan Struktural Dalam Politik Penegakan Hukum Sumber Daya 
Alam Dan Lingkungan Hidup,” Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi 5, no. 2–2 (2020): 65–74, 
https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v5i2-2.483. 
24 Muslihudin Muslihudin et al., “Relationship between Environmental Damage and Corruption 
Cases in Indonesia,” E3S Web of Conferences 73 (2018): 1–5, 
https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20187302011. 
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the recommendations for action plans. The corruption takes the form of 
collusion between the project owner and the compilers of the EIA and the EIA 
assessment commission to be more favorable to their interests. 3) Corruption 
by the Regional Head collects money against all entrepreneurs who apply for 
EIA. 
Law No. 32/2009 On protection and management of the environment has 
set several requirements that must be met before issuing a license and the 
commencement of any environment-related activity, including spatial 
planning, environmental quality standards, environmental impact analysis, 
and licensing. However, despite all these standards and prerequisites, 
pollution and corruption still occur in Indonesia.25 This shows that existing 
regulations have not been balanced with honest and independent government 
actors and law enforcers. Thus, two main problems can be drawn in the pattern 
of environmental corruption in general, namely: first, the lack of integrity and 
independence of officials in a fat bureaucratic structure, and second, weak 
policies and supervision in the environmental sector. 
2. The Concept of Independent Agencies 
Law No. 32/2009 on environmental protection has set several requirements 
that The emergence and existence of the Independent agencies is an interesting 
and important thing to observe. This phenomenon occurs nationally during the 
transition to democracy in Indonesia and globally, which has emerged 
alongside the new wave of democratization worldwide.26 Public service 
affairs, which the central/executive agency initially monopolized, were then 
separated and scattered into various types of independent state agencies, 
which are commonly called "Independent agencies/bodies".27 Such 
institutions include the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, the 
Commission des Operations de Bourse in Italy, or The Commissions for 
Racial Equality in the UK.28 
Some scholars in the United States and Europe have tried to draw clear 
definitions of an independent agency. Funk and Seamon stated that one 
category of the institution is often considered outside the executive branch of 
power called "Independent regulatory agencies". They further elaborate that 
"independent" means certain characteristics that insulate the agency from 
                                                             
25 Sukanda Husin and Hilaire Tegnan, “Corruption Eradication within the Protection of the 
Environment in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Water, Environment and Pollution 14, no. 4 
(2017): 99–108, https://doi.org/10.3233/AJW-170040. 
26 Koen Verhoest et al., Autonomy and Control of State Agencies: Comparing States and 
Agencies, 1st ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230277274. 
27 Rizki Ramadani, “Lembaga Negara Independen Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Konsep 
Independent Regulatory Agencies,” Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum 27, no. 11 (2020): 169–92, 
https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol27.iss1.art9. 
28 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara, 5th ed. (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo 
Persada, 2015). 




control by the president, where normal executive agencies are subject.29 Other 
scholars such as Knapp and Meny define Independent agencies as independent 
bodies with a regulatory and supervisory function.30 This aspect of 
independence and regulatory authority is also emphasized by Gillardi, who 
states that IRAs are a public organization with regulatory powers that are 
neither elected by the people nor directly managed by elected officials such as 
the president.31  
An institution could be recognized as an independent agency if it is not 
under the president's direct control (presidential control), where the other 
institutions such as ministries are subject to. Furthermore, Funk and Seamon 
provide the following characteristic of the independent agencies:32 (1) They 
are headed by multi-member groups, rather than a single agency head; (2) no 
more than a simple majority of these members may come from one political 
party; (3) the member of the group has fixed, staggered terms, so that their 
terms do not expire at the same time; and (4) they can only be removed from 
their position for “cause”, unlike most executive officials, who serve at the 
pleasure of the president. 
The above characteristics can be seen within the independent agencies in 
Indonesia, which is institutionalized through such agencies' regulation or 
enabling act.  For example, Law No. 30 of 2002 Jo. Law No. 19 of  2019 
concerning the second revision of Corruption Eradication Corruption (KPK). 
An analysis of the institutional aspects of the KPK as the independent agency 
can be seen in the following table: 
                                                             
29 Rizki Ramadani and Andika Prawira Buana, “The Needed but Unwanted Independent 
Regulatory Agencies: Questioning Their Legitimacy and Control in Indonesia,” in Proceedings 
of the 2nd International Conference of Law, Government and Social Justice (ICOLGAS 2020) 
(Dordrecht: Atlantis Press, 2020), 674–84, https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201209.351. 
30 Yves Mény and Andrew Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, 
France, Italy, Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
31 Fabrizio Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in 
Western Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009). 
32 William F. Funk and Richard H. Seamon, Administrative Law: Examples and Explanations 
(New York: Aspen Publishers, 2009). 
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Table 1. The Characteristics of KPK As Independent Agency 
Source: Author's Processed Results, December 2020. 
With the institutional concept and design described above, the independent 
agency model has several advantages over ordinary state institutions such as 
executive agencies or ministries. The multi-member leadership model 
(commissioners) with the collegial collective system can make it challenging 
to implement the agency's duties and decisions. Fixed-term office with 
staggered terms also guarantees independence for members and the leaders 
from politicization and external interference. So that in general, the 
independent agency has an institutional design that guarantees and protects 
the functional, structural, and personnel independence of its actors, including 
against the possibility of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. 
3. Independent Agencies Performance in Anti-Corruption and 
Environmental Sector 
Corruption mostly thrives under conditions of secrecy and power 
imbalances. Weak institutions increase the likelihood of corruption because 
the actors do not have incentives to act cleanly and are not constrained from 
NO INDEPENDENCE ASPECTS ARTICLE IN KPK LAW 
1 Headed by multi-member groups, 
rather than a single agency head 
Article 21 (1) no. 3 The 
Chairperson of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission consist 
of 5 (five) Members of the 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission 
2 No more than a simple majority of 
these members may come from one 
political party 
Article 29 To be appointed as the 
Chairperson of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission must 
meet the following 
requirements: ... h. does not 
become an administrator of a 
political party 
3 The member of the group has fixed, 
staggered terms 
Article 34 The Chairperson of 
the Corruption Eradication 
Commission shall hold office for 
4 (four) years and may be re-
elected only for one term 
4 Can only be removed from their 
position for “cause” 
Article 32 (1) The Chair of the 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission stops or is 
dismissed because: a. die; b. 
term of office ends; c. be 
accused for committing a crime; 
d. unable to remain permanently 
or continuously for more than 3 
(three) months unable to carry 
out their duties; e. resign; or f. be 
subject to sanctions under this 
Law. 
 




such behavior because mechanisms ensuring transparency, participation, 
accountability, and integrity are missing.33 In the case of Indonesia, most of 
the independent agencies were formed after the reform era to reform old state 
institutions with poor performance or corruptive behavior. For example, 
independent agencies such as the Judicial Commission (KY) were formed to 
balance and supervise the judicial power has been known for decades as a 
hotbed of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Likewise, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) was intended to become a super body and 
trigger mechanism for eradicating corruption, all because the police and 
prosecutors, as anti-corruption law enforcers, often become corruptors 
themselves.34  
At this point, these agencies gained high trust from the public because of 
their independent and autonomous performance. In general, they have what is 
called structural and functional independence. Structural independence refers 
to the constitutional position of an independent agency as a new branch of 
government in a new separation of powers system.35 These agencies are not 
under the executive or legislative branch but are still within the check and 
balance principle framework. This can guarantee their position from political 
intervention and subordination. Apart from the KPK, these institutions are the 
General Election Commission (KPU), The National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM), etc. Functional independence refers to 
autonomy in carrying out duties and powers without intervention from any 
parties. This aspect has also been widely institutionalized in the regulations or 
enabling act of the agency such as KPK (Law No 32 year 2002 jo. 19 year 
2019), KPU (Law No. 15 Year 2011), and KY (Law No. 18 Year 2011). These 
two aspects of independence can provide guarantees for a more transparent 
and accountable public service delivery. 
It can be said that the public has a greater expectation of these agencies 
rather than the government itself. This is shown, for example, by a survey 
from the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in 2019 of 1,220 respondents. The 
results show that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is the most 
trusted institution by the public with a presentation of 84%, followed by the 
president (79%), the police (72%), the Courts (71%), the DPR (61%), and 
Political Parties. (53%). These results contrast with other surveys from LSI on 
trends in public perceptions of democracy, corruption, and intolerance. As a 
result, the police, courts, and civil servants are categorized as institutions with 
                                                             
33 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, “Cursed by Resources or Institutions?,” 
World Economy 29, no. 8 (2006): 1117–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00808.x. 
34 Rizki Ramadani and Moch Andry Wikra Wardhana Mamonto, “Legalitas Sanksi Pidana 
Pencabutan Hak Politik Bagi Terpidana Korupsi: Perspektif Hak Asasi Manusia,” Petitum 7, 
no. 2 (2019): 63–71, https://doi.org/10.33096/substantivejustice.v1i2.18. 
35 Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers,” Harvard Law Review 113, no. 3 (2000): 
633–729, https://doi.org/10.2307/1342286. 
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a high corruption index.36 The presence of the KPK in the last 15 years is also 
considered to have made a positive contribution through strict enforcement of 
major corruption cases, arresting more than 1,000 public officials with a 
success rate of more than 75%, monitoring of law enforcement efforts in 
corruption cases, and public awareness in instilling a spirit of integrity.37 
Concerning the environment, the KPK, since 2010, has launched the 
natural resource sector and energy security as one of the focus areas for 
eradicating corruption in the KPK's 2011-2015 strategic plan. Based on the 
2014 KPK Performance Accountability Report, there were several efforts by 
the KPK in handling cases of corruption in natural resources. These efforts 
were made by the KPK, among others, through monitoring action plans in 
forest management, licensing natural resources, and coal mining policies. 
There have also been many studies on forestry, fishery, and mineral and coal 
systems, including investigations and prosecutions of 18 corruption cases in 
the natural resources sector by 2014.38 The results of this performance gained 
a quite high appreciation and trust from the community.39 
The key to the success of an independent institution such as the KPK lies 
in guaranteeing the institution's independence and carrying out its duties with 
the principle of transparency, accountability, and civil society participation. 
This is rarely found in the context of government bureaucracy. Also, many 
independent agencies are given constitutional authority by the legislature (by 
law) to exercise power independently. These federal agencies practically carry 
out special functions of government that Funk and Seamon can characterize 
as quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, quasi-judicial, or a combination of these 
three functions.40 
An example of such an agency in the environmental sector is the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States, which 
specializes in protecting environmental pollution. The history of the EPA 
began In early 1970 due to heightened public concerns about deteriorating city 
air, natural areas littered with debris, and urban water supplies contaminated 
with dangerous impurities. President Nixon responded by creating a council 
to consider organizing federal government programs designed to reduce 
pollution. Those programs could efficiently address the goals laid out in his 
                                                             
36 Indra Komara, “Survei LSI Polisi, Pengadilan Dan PNS Instansi Paling Korup,” Detiknews, 
2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4227042/survei-lsi-polisi-pengadilan-dan-pns-instansi-
paling-korup. 
37 Wawan Suyatmiko and Lvin Nicola, “Inisiatif Penguatan Lembaga Antikorupsi Indonesia: 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 2015-2019,” Tranparancy International, 2018, 
https://ti.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/FINAL-Bahasa-ACA-Assessment-Report_TII.pdf. 
38 Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), “Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK 2014” (Jakarta, 
2014). 
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message on the environment. The president sent to Congress a plan to 
consolidate many environmental responsibilities of the federal government 
under one agency, a new Environmental Protection Agency.41  
EPA has regulatory power since it can set rules to prohibit communities 
from destroying wetlands. The EPA also conducts investigations on those 
suspected of violating these rules. If someone has been determined to violate 
them, the EPA can impose sanctions in the form of several fines. Thus it also 
has quasi-judicial authorities. Base on this fact, Funk and Seamon said, "In a 
sense, EPA acts like a legislature, a police officer, and a court all rolled into 
one."42 
The federal government, especially Congress, has given the EPA 
considerable powers in carrying out its function to maintain environmental 
health. There are about 33 laws regarding the environment that intersect with 
the functions and duties of the EPA and 14 other regulations related to 
regulatory processes.43 In general, the EPA not only sets regulations and 
standards for environmental pollution but can also ban permits for the 
construction of major new and/or modified sources of a pollutant, even 
imposing its federal plan and regulations to the local government.44 The EPA 
Regulatory power also includes establishing industry-specific emission 
standards to construct new pollution sources such as factories and other 
facilities, where they are required to meet standards and adopt as low emission 
technologies as possible. In addition, under the Clean Air Act, the EPA has 
the power to regulate most motorized vehicles, including the power to impose 
testing and certification requirements for engines, as well as specific fuel 
formulations. This power is broad enough that it has been able to reduce the 
level of pollution. As stated by Currie and Walker, with the consistent 
monitoring by EPA, The Air quality in the United States has improved 
dramatically over the past 50 years. 45 
As the embodiment of the "polluter pays" principle in environmental law, 
EPA gave authority to impose a sanction in the form of a fine to the polluters. 
The EPA fines firms for violating US environmental laws or emitting noxious 
pollutants into the air, water, or land, which can negatively affect the 
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community. Based on the research by Romero et al.,46 This shows that the 
legal sanctions and fines issued by the EPA have a significant influence in 
encouraging companies to behave more responsibly in environmental matters. 
There is also the fact that the larger an activity or company, the greater the 
penalty received; thus, the size of the polluting company determines the 
amount of the fine received. 
 
4. Recommendation For Policy and Supervision  
The United Nations has merged Millennium Development Goals into 
Sustainable Development Goals and published the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda. Goal No.16 has stressed the need to "substantially 
reduce corruption and bribery; promote the rule of law; develop effective, 
accountable, and transparent institutions; ensure responsive, inclusive, 
participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels; strengthen 
relevant national institutions, and ensure equal access to justice for all".47 
Under the UN SDGs, UNDP's Global Anti-Corruption Initiatives (GAIN) 
(2014-2017) has adopted the strategy as a lead role in strengthening UNDP’s 
policy and program, among them are:48 Expanding the political and normative 
agenda on anti-corruption by integrating anti-corruption in service delivery; 
Strengthening state/institutional capacities to prevent and combat corruption, 
and improving institutional effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives and 
monitoring their results. 
Refers to the policy lines above, we can see that there is an emphasis on 
the role of the government through state institutional reform. This is 
understandable, given that a simple bureaucracy, qualified and independent 
government apparatus and government credibility are important factors that 
determine a successful environmental sustainability program.49 The problems 
related to environmental, including environmental corruption, could be 
effectively overcome if government institutions work in a professional, 
transparent, accountable, and full of integrity.50 To The  study  conducted by 
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Duit51 Has been proven that good public governance practice in governmental 
institutions has a  positive implication to environmental sustainability 
performance. The higher the country's public governance, the higher the 
environmental sustainability performance that country will be.  
Based on the description above and the analysis on the patterns of 
environmental corruption and its problem gaps, a number of recommendations 
for environmental corruption policy and supervision in Indonesia can be 
formulated as follows: First, there needs to be institutional and managerial 
reform in the environmental sector through the formation of the independent 
agency. The choice to form a new independent agency was based on 
considering that this type of institution has a number of advantages over 
ordinary state institutions such as executive agencies or ministries. The multi-
member leadership makes it difficult to intervene, the staggered term of office 
that guarantees independence for members, and the leaders from political 
interference. So that in general, the independent agency has an institutional 
design that guarantees and protects the agency against the possibility of 
intervention and the strong desire for corruption, collusion, and nepotism. 
There are other options for downsizing state institutions by forming new 
divisions within existing independent agencies, such as in the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK). However, it is felt that this will not be 
optimal because the KPK is an institution whose focus is not only on the 
environment but on corruption in general. 
Meanwhile, the current situation requires a regulatory and supervisory 
authority in the environmental sector that is independent and free from 
political influence. Second, the new independent agency in the environmental 
sector must be accompanied by a delegation of authority from the government 
or laws to formulate and implement policies in environmental protection, 
management, and monitoring. As well as giving the authority to investigate 
and impose sanctions and fines similar to EPA in the United States. 
  
Figure 2. Environmental Corruption Policy Model 
Source: Author’s result, 2020. 
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The Third recommendation is compiling a national strategic program in 
the form of work synergy between independent agencies in the environmental 
sector and the anti-corruption agency (KPK), with the participation of civil 
society in eradicating environmental corruption. Synergy and collaboration 
are essential aspects in eradicating corruption. This is necessary to avoid 
different perceptions, overlapping authority, and sectoral egos in carrying out 
tasks in the field. With this policy and supervision model, it is assumed to 
maximize efforts to eradicate environmental corruption. It is hoped that 
environmental policies and supervision in independent institutions can be 
carried out more transparently and accountably. With guarantees of 
independence both structurally and functionally, independent institutions are 
deemed more appropriate to implement policies and monitor an environment 
prone to corrupt practices. The design of institutional independence can better 




Several environmental and anti-corruption policies at the global level have 
emphasized the importance of the state's role through its institutions in 
maintaining environmental quality and eradicating corruption. The old 
structure of state institutions and their fat bureaucracy has become an opening 
for environmental corruption. A corrupt bureaucracy will lead to weak 
environmental policies and supervision, which will result in more state losses 
and environmental damage. Based on this, it is necessary to formulate policies 
through institutional reform and management of the environmental sector by 
forming an independent agency. The design of an independent agency can 
guarantee functional and structural independence, which is expected to protect 
its actors from conflicts of interest and power intervention. Thus, it can 
overcome the corrupt culture in the old bureaucracy. Also, there needs to be 
synergy between independent agencies in the environment and the anti-
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